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CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION IN MEDIATION:
METHODS AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN NORTH DAKOTA
DANIEL R. CONRAD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The overcrowding of court dockets and the time consuming process
of litigation have led to the increased popularity of alternative methods
of dispute resolution. One such alternative method is mediation. Medi-
ation differs greatly from litigation in that the parties themselves struc-
ture a way to settle their dispute with the aid of a "mediator," a neutral
third party who guides the disputants through their own settlement
negotiations.' Mediation has generally proven to be more cost effective
and less time consuming than litigation. 2
One problem that has plagued the movement toward the use of
mediation is the scope of the confidentiality in mediation proceedings. 3
Although most would agree that some form of confidentiality is neces-
sary and desirable in mediation proceedings, there is little agreement on
the scope of confidentiality that should be provided. 4 It is clear, how-
ever, that for mediation to be successful, there must be a free flow of
information between the parties. 5 By assuring that information disclosed
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Rodney S. Webb, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota. J.D., University of North Dakota, 1996.
1. See, e.g., Kent L. Brown, Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation: Status and Implications,
1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 307, 308-09 (1991). One commentator referred to the mediation process as one
of "hash[ing] it out" with each other rather than "thrash[ing] it out" against each other. See
Christopher H. Macturk, Note, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Best Protection Has Exceptions, 19
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 411,434 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 37 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. DIsp.
RESOL. 25 (1992) (discussing the problem of confidentiality in mediation and the arguments for and
against an absolute privilege); see also Peter N. Thompson, Confidentiality, Competency and
Confusion: The Uncertain Promise of the Mediation Privilege in Minnesota, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'Y 329 (1997).
4. See Michael L. Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 12
SETON HALL LEGts. J. 1, 1 (1988); Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A
Commentary, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17, 30 (1988).
5. See Macturk, supra note 1, at 415 (citing Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc.,
608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985));
see also Michael A. Perino, Drafting Mediation Privileges: Lessons From the Civil Justice Reform Act,
26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 6 (1995) (citing Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration
of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. DIsp. RESOL. 235, 248 (1993)). Because
mediation requires parties to come to their own settlement under the guidance of a neutral third party,
the mediator has no decision making power and cannot coerce parties into being open and forthright.
See Local 808, Bldg. Maintenance, Serv. & R.R. Workers v. National Mediation Bd., 888 F.2d 1428,
1436 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that mediation is an art form that relies heavily on powers of persuasion
rather than coercion and adjudication). Unless the parties to a mediation are assured of some form of
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during a mediation session will remain confidential and will not be used
later against the parties, the flow of information will be enhanced. 6
Furthermore, guarantees of confidentiality facilitate an atmosphere of
fairness and trust between the parties and the mediator, which is essential
to an effective mediation.7
This article will provide an overview of the different methods that
have been utilized to insure that some form of confidentiality exists in
mediation proceedings. This article will then discuss these various types
of protection under North Dakota law, focusing primarily on the protec-
tion offered by section 31-04-11 of the North Dakota Century Code.8
II. METHODS OF ASSURING CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
SESSIONS
Because some level of confidentiality is necessary for mediation
to be successful, various methods of protecting confidentiality in medi-
ation have developed. Those forms include: private contracts, common
law rules of privilege, evidentiary rules, and mediation confidentiality
statutes.
A. CONFIDENTIALITY CONTRACTS
The first method by which parties have tried to assure that medi-
ation proceedings will remain confidential is by contract. The contracts
are intended to prevent the parties from disclosing certain information
confidentiality, they will not have the motivation to fully participate in the process and make open and
frank disclosures to other disputants and the mediator. Lake Utopia Paper, 608 F.2d at 930. As one
commentator noted:
[F]or the process to work, it is essential for the mediator to encourage the parties to
discuss candidly with her all of the relevant issues, especially those that may be impeding
settlement. To help the parties resolve their dispute, the mediator must be able to
evaluate the parties' real motives and interests. The mediation process involves drawing
out of the parties a list of all relevant issues and encouraging compromise and
accommodation. The mediator's ability to assure that facts conveyed to her will remain
confidential aids this process. Indeed, . . . mediation becomes 'impossible if the parties
[are] constantly looking over their shoulders.'
Ferino, supra, at 6 (citing Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation:
The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 37, 38 (1986)); see also Alan Kirtley, The Medi-
ation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard
to Protect Mediation Participants, The Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 8-10
(1995).
6. See, e~g., Brown, supra note 1, at 310.
7. See N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980); Royal Caribbean Corp.
v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In Macaluso, the court noted that the
parties involved in mediation sessions must have the confidence that information disclosed will not
subsequently be divulged, voluntarily or by compulsion. Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 53-56. The court went
on to note that: "[T]he complete exclusion of mediator testimony is necessary to the preservation of
an effective system of labor mediation, and . . . labor mediation is essential to continued industrial
stability, a public interest sufficiently great to outweigh the interest in obtaining every person's
evidence." Id. at 56.
8. N.D. CEr. CODE § 31-04-11 (1996).
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discovered during the mediation. 9 However, enforcement of confidenti-
ality contracts can be problematic. 10 For instance, when evidence is
sought by a nonparty to the agreement, the agreement is generally not
binding on the nonparty, and can be viewed as an attempt to suppress
evidence."I The agreement is normally held to be against public policy
in those cases and void.1 2 Thus, contractual agreements in mediation
proceedings to protect confidentiality are generally not very effective
because they do not apply to non-parties to the contract.
Private agreements may also be problematic when enforcement is
sought between parties to the agreement. The agreements may not serve
as an effective deterrent because the remedy is defined by contract law,
and actual damages may be difficult to prove. 13 Furthermore, courts
may find that without legislation supporting the use of confidentiality
agreements, such agreements are void as against public policy even when
it is the parties of the contract seeking enforcement. 14 Therefore, private
agreements do not appear to be the most effective method of protecting
confidentiality in mediation.
B. EVIDENTIARY RULES
Other possible sources of confidentiality protection for parties in
mediation are federal and state rules of evidence. 15 At a minimum, medi-
ation discussions receive the same amount of confidentiality protection
in subsequent litigation as traditional settlement negotiations.16 The
protection is derived from Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or
its state equivalent even though Rule 408 does not expressly state that
mediated settlements are covered. 17  Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states:
9. See Macturk, supra note 1, at 417-18; Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality:
Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 157, 165 (1994); Eric R. Max,
Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 215-16 (1993).
10. See Macturk, supra note 1, at 417-18.
11. See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 166; see also Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals
Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84, 87-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). In Grumman, the court held that parties should not be
permitted to contract privately for confidentiality of documents, which would prohibit others from
obtaining relevant materials in the course of litigation. Id. The court therefore held that a party to a
confidentiality agreement had to comply with a discovery request made by a nonparty to the
agreement. Id.
12. Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 166; see also Macturk, supra note 1, at 417-18 (citing United
States v. Kentucky Util. Co., 927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991)).
13. See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 166.
14. See Macturk, supra note 1, at 417 (citing Brown, supra note 1, at 318; Freedman & Prigoff,
supra note 2, at 41; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Ch. 37, App. C (West 1990) (pertaining to confidentiality
contracts)).
15. See FED. R. EvIo. 408; N.D. R. EvID. 408.
16. Max, supra note 9, at 214.
17. See FED. R. EvID. 408; see also N.D. R. EVID. 408.
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Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish,
or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compro-
mise negotiations is likewise not admissible. 18
"At common law, only offers of compromise or settlement were
inadmissible to prove liability or amount of the claim in subsequent liti-
gation."' 9 Statements other than the offer could be admitted. 20 Further-
more, the offer itself could be admitted to prove bias or to impeach a
witness. 21 Rule 408 broadens the common law protection by making
inadmissible the conduct and statements surrounding the settlement. 22
Rule 408 was passed to encourage settlement and exclude evidence
related to a compromise because that evidence is normally of low
probative value.23
Rule 408 is subject to some key exceptions. First, the rule does not
protect evidence related to the mediation if it is to be used for "another
purpose," such as proving bias. 24 Second, Rule 408 does not address
the discoverability of such negotiations. 25 Thus, a mediation may be
vulnerable to a discovery request in later litigation even if the informa-
tion could not be used during trial under Rule 408.26 Third, Rule 408
only addresses issues that are in dispute; therefore, items not in dispute,
such as the payment schedule, may be admissible. 27 Finally, Rule 408
attaches to the information rather than the people involved in a media-
tion. Hence, a mediator who is subpoenaed to appear in subsequent
litigation cannot use Rule 408 as protection to quash the subpoena. 28
Therefore, Rule 408 and its state equivalents do not appear to provide
adequate confidentiality protection for mediation sessions by themselves.
18. FED. R. EVID. 408.
19. Macturk, supra note 1, at 418; see also Brown, supra note 1, at 312.
20. M ctIrk, S,n.. !,at . 4! .
21. Id.
22. FED. R. EvID. 408.
23. Macturk, supra note 1, at 418 (noting that evidence of settlements is normally not probative
because the parties may be motivated by achieving peace rather than admitting liability).
24. FED. R. EvID. 408; see also Freidus v. First Nat'l. Bank of Council Bluffs, 928 F.2d 793, 794-95
(8th Cir. 1991); Max, supra note 9, at 215.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
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C. COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE
Courts on occasion have found, absent a statutory privilege, that
information brought out during mediation is privileged under common
law. 29 A privilege is different from Rule 408 protection because the
right to claim a privilege belongs to the parties to the mediation, and thus
can be raised even if the parties to the mediation are not parties in the
subsequent litigation. 30 Furthermore, the privilege not only protects the
information from being brought out in litigation, but it may also protect
the information from discovery requests. 3 I Courts generally apply a
four-part test when confronted with the issue of common law privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in confidence that
they will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one
which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater., than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 32
This four-part Wigmore test, as it is often called, was cited favorably
by the court in N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc.33 In Macaluso, the
court held that exclusion of testimony by a mediator "is necessary to the
preservation of an effective system of labor mediation," which in turn is
vitally important to the economic health of the nation. 34 Therefore, the
court found that the mediation was entitled to a privilege under the
Wigmore balancing test.35 However, the common law privilege is not the
most effective method of keeping mediation confidential because courts
are not always willing to recognize it, thereby making confidentiality
uncertain when parties enter mediation. 36
29. See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 161-62; Macturk, supra note 1, at 420; Brown, supra note 1,
at 315.
30. See Macturk, supra note 1, at 420. Macturk notes that "'[t]he privilege may be raised by or
on behalf of anyone who holds it,' as opposed to an evidentiary objection, like Rule 408, which must
be raised by a party to the litigation." Id. (quoting NANcY H. ROGERs & C RAit A MCEWEN, MEDIATION:
LAW, Poucy, PRACTICE § 9:04 (2d ed. 1994)).
31. See id.; see also FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b).
32. J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (1961) (emphasis original); United States v. Nix-
on, 418 U.S. 683, 710-13 (1974) (dealing with executive privilege and balancing the general privilege
of confidential presidential communications against the specific need for evidence in a pending crimi-
nal trial); United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 103-04 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying a similar four
part test in federal courts).
33. 618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980).
34. N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9th Cir. 1980).
35. See id.
36. See State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that privileges
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue of
an "ombudsman privilege" in workplace mediation sessions. 37 The
Eighth Circuit refused to recognize a common law privilege over medi-
ation sessions conducted by ombudsman in the workplace. 38 The court
reasoned that the proponent of the privilege failed to overcome the
significant burden of showing that the proposed privilege served a public
good that outweighed the principle of ascertaining the truth by all
rational means. 39 The conservative approach taken by the Eighth Circuit
exemplifies the uncertainty associated with common law privileges.
D. STATUTORY PROTECTION
Most states provide some statutory or evidentiary protection for con-
fidentiality of events that transpire during mediation sessions. 40 These
jurisdictions have concluded that public policy requires the encour-
agement of confidential communications within the special mediation
are not creatures of judicial decisions); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (111. 1983) (holding
that expansion and creation of privileges should be left to the legislature); In re Parkway Manor
Healthcare Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that there is a longstanding
judicial hostility toward evidentiary privileges).
37. See Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 792 (8th Cir. 1997). An "ombuds-
man" in that case referred to "an employee outside of the corporate chain of command whose job is to
investigate and mediate workplace disputes . . . . [T]he corporate ombudsman purports to be an
independent and neutral party who promises strict confidentiality to all employees and is bound by the
Code of Ethics of the Corporate Ombudsman Association." Id. at 792-93.
38. Id. at 794-95.
39. Id. at 793. The court noted that new common law privileges are not created lightly. Id.
Further, the court held that a corporate ombudsman is able to promise confidentiality and maintain
neutrality without the existence of a privilege. Id. at 793-94. The possibility of later use of the
information brought out in a mediated settlement in later civil litigation was not enough to justify the
creation of a new privilege. See id. at 793.
40. See Kirtley, supra note 5, at 2-4; see also ROGERS & M cEWEN, supra note 30, at 204 (listing,
by scope and jurisdiction, selected confidentiality legislation).
State statutes dealing generally with mediation proceedings include the following: ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (1994); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-28 (West Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-22-307 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102 (West Supp. 1996) (court ordered mediation), § 90.501
(West 1988) (the general privilege rule of evidence), and § 455.2235 (West Supp. 1998) (establishing
rules governing mediation); 710 ILL. CoMT. ANN. STAT. 20/6 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679.12
(West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West
iou 2, ,uV. !a);. "A. A .... T. . 435.04 (West i992); MONT. C ODE ANN. § 26-1-811 (1997);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.109 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(H) (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805 (West
1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.073 (West. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22
(Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070 (West 1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 904.085 (West
Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. § 1-43-103 (Michie 1997). Furthermore, many states have promulgated
privilege statutes for specific areas such as divorce or child custody mediation. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 583.26 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (farm mediation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-06 (1997)
(child custody).
Several model statutes have been proposed as well. See Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Medi-
ator Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17,71-73 (1988). Also, the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution drafted a model provision for presenta-
tion to the ABA House of Delegates, but it has never been adopted. Id. at 65-70. See also Thompson,
supra note 3, at 372-75 (outlining a proposed statute for Minnesota).
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relationship, without which the relationship would be ineffective. 4 1 The
mediation relationship is viewed as having sufficient social importance to
justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the
litigation of claims.42
Although the goal of each of the states in promulgating a confi-
dentiality statute or evidentiary rule for mediation was likely similar, the
resulting provisions are dramatically different in scope, content, and
operation. 43 These differences reflect the "difficulty of creating a rule
which strikes the proper balance between mediation's need for confi-
dentiality and the public's interest in access to certain types of infor-
mation." 44  Some of the differences include: 1) protection only for
mediations that take place in certain mediation facilities, such as
statutorily created community dispute resolution centers; 45 2) protection
only for those subjects relating to or arising out of the "matter in
dispute;" 46 and 3) evidentiary protection in subsequent litigation only,
with no protection from discovery. 47 Some states, however, have promul-
gated statutes which provide a blanket protection by stating that anything
that transpires during mediation will be deemed confidential and will be
suppressed.4 8 Confidentiality statutes appear to be the soundest method
of protecting confidentiality in mediation sessions because of the
predictable protection a thorough statute can provide.49
III. CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION IN NORTH DAKOTA
In North Dakota, there are b'asically three methods by which confi-
dentiality in mediation may be protected. Those methods include:
private confidentiality agreements; Rule 408 of the North Dakota Rules
41. See Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 160-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that public
policy is to promote mediation as a preferable alternative to litigation by providing confidentiality); see
also Kirtley, supra note 5, at 15.
42. Kirtley, supra note 5, at 15.
43. See supra note 40.
44. Kirtley, supra note 5, at 4.
45. See 710 ILL. Comp. ASN. STAT. 20/6 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679.12 (West 1987);
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b (McKinney 1992).
46. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
691.1557 (West Supp. 1997); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220
(1996); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(b) (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22
(Michie 1992).
47. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1995).
48. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.109 (Michie 1993) (containing an exception for other-
wise discoverable and admissible evidence).
49. However, statutory protection is not without its problems, especially in multi-state litigation,
due to the disparity between states' confidentiality provisions. See, e.g., Max, supra note 9 (discussing
the problems associated with confidentiality in multi-state, multi-party environmental litigation);
Rosenberg, supra note 9 (discussing the problems with state confidentiality statutes and multi-state
litigation).
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of Evidence; 50 and section 31-04-11 of the North Dakota Century
Code.51
A. CONFIDENTIALITY CONTRACTS
There is no case law in North Dakota discussing the validity of
private confidentiality contracts. However, there is evidence of the use of
confidentiality contracts, as well as an indication that remedies for breach
are governed by the principles of contract law. 52 In his testimony before
the House Judiciary Committee on S.B. 2308, Michael Liffrig, a practic-
ing mediator, stated that he "has all clients sign a form at the beginning
of services which states that they will not subpoena him or will not
compel any writings or documents during mediation to any civil
action." 53 Liffrig went on to state that statutory protection would make
confidentiality more certain than the use of private agreements because a
breach would no longer be solely an issue of contract law. 54 Because the
courts have yet to address the validity of confidentiality contracts in
North Dakota, parties to mediation proceedings would be wise to be
leery of their effectiveness.
B. RULE 408
Under Rule 408 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, offers of
compromise are generally not admissible to prove "liability, nonliability,
or the amount of a claim." 55 Rule 408 of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence was patterned after its federal equivalent, and "extends the
exclusionary treatment not only to offers of compromise, but also to
completed compromises when offered against the compromiser." 56
Furthermore, Rule 408 extends to evidence of settlements between
litigants and third parties. 57 The objective of Rule 408 is to encourage
out-of-court compromise and settlement of disputes so as to "obviate
50. N.D. R. EvID. 408.
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (1996).
52. See Hearings on S. 2308 Before the North Dakota House Judiciary Comm., 51st Legis. Sess.,
Mar. i5, i989 (testimony ot Michael Litfig) (codified as N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (1989)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Thomas v. Stickland, 500 N.W.2d 598, 600 (N.D. 1993) (citing Zimprich v. North Dakota
Harvestore Sys., Inc., 461 N.W.2d 425 (N.D. 1990)); see also Reiger v. Wiedmer, 531 N.W.2d 308,
311 (N.D. 1995).
56. Thomas, 500 N.W.2d at 600 (citing 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1408[04] (1989)).
57. Id. (citing McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985)).
[VOL. 74:45
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the need for costly and time-consuming litigation."5 8 However, while
Rule 408 does exclude evidence of settlement if offered to prove liability
or nonliability or the amount of the claim, it does not protect settlement
evidence for other purposes such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness. 59 Additionally, the question of whether to allow in evidence of
settlement is within the discretion of the trial court.60
As a safeguard of confidentiality, Rule 408 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence suffers. Although it serves well in protecting a medi-
ating party in subsequent litigation when another party attempts to bring
into evidence the mediation discussions to prove liability or nonliability,
it is useless when the information is used for other purposes. Further-
more, Rule 408 does not protect parties who have mediated their dispute
from discovery requests in subsequent litigation. Additionally, whether a
litigating party is attempting to bring in information about mediation
discussions for "another purpose" is a hazy area subject to the dis-
cretion of the trial court. Because it is uncertain how a court would rule
in a given instance, parties should be insecure about confidentiality when
entering mediation with only Rule 408 on their side.
C. STATUTORY PROTECTION
Because of the uncertain protection offered by private confidentiali-
ty agreements and Rule 408, the North Dakota Legislature, in 1989,
promulgated section 31-04-11 of the North Dakota Century Code to pro-
tect the confidentiality of mediation sessions. Section 31-04-11 states:
When persons agree to conduct and participate in a mediation
for the purpose of compromising, settling, or resolving a dis-
pute, evidence of anything said or of any admission made in
the course of the mediation is inadmissible as evidence and dis-
closure may not be compelled in any subsequent civil proceed-
ing except as provided in this section. This section does not
limit the compulsion nor the admissibility of evidence if:
1. The evidence relates to a crime, civil fraud, or a violation
under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act;
2. The evidence relates to a breach of duty by the mediator;
3. The validity of the mediated agreement is in issue; or
58. Id. (noting that "[t]he spectre of subsequent use [of a settlement] to prejudice a separate and
discrete claim is a disincentive which Rule 408 seeks to prevent" (quoting Branch v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of New York, 783 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1986))). See also Reiger, 531 N.W.2d at 311 (noting
that Rule 408 reflects the policy of encouraging negotiations and settlements without judicial
intervention).
59. Thomas, 500 N.W.2d at 600.
60. Id.
1998]
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4. All persons who conducted or otherwise participated in the
mediation consent to disclosure. 61
Section 31-04-11 was patterned after California law as it stood in 1989,
and was passed to "take [the] fear out of the mediation process." 62
Currently, there is no case law in North Dakota interpreting the
scope of the protection provided by section 31-04-11. Recently, how-
ever, the North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the scope of protection
offered by a similar statute in Holum v. Trinity Medical Center.63 In
Holum, the court analyzed the scope of the medical peer review privilege
statute.64 In doing so, the court indicated how it might interpret other
statutory evidentiary restrictions such as section 31-04-11.65
In Holum, the court initially noted that under Rule 501 of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence, no privilege may exist unless it is provided
for by constitution, statute, or rule. 66  The court also noted that
"[e]videntiary privileges must be narrowly construed because they are in
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (1996).
62. See Hearings on S. 2308 Before the North Dakota House Judiciary Comm., 51st Legis. Sess.
Mar. 15, 1989 (statement of Senator Jack Ingstad, sponsor of the bill). The California law in 1989
read almost exactly the same as section 31-04-11. It read in part: "(i) Evidence of anything said or
of any admission made in the course of the mediation is not admissible in evidence, and disclosure of
any such evidence shall not be compelled, in any civil action in which, pursuant to law, testimony can
be compelled to be given." See Historical and Statutory Notes, CAL. EvD. CODE § 1119 (1997) (noting
the text of the statute, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1152, before the 1993 and 1997 amendments).
As well as being patterned after California law, section 31-04-11 also resembles the confiden-
tiality statutes of several other states. See Hearing on S. 2308 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 51st Legis. Sess. (N.D. 1985) (letter to the Honorable Jack lngstad, State Senator, from Jim
Ganje of the North Dakota Legislative Counsel, Mar. 15, 1989). Those states referenced by Mr.
Ganje in 1989 as resembling the proposed North Dakota statute included: Colorado, Michigan, New
York, Oklahoma, and Oregon. Id.; see also supra note 40.
63. 544 N.W.2d 148 (N.D. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (1991) (repealed 1997). Al-
though section 23-01-02.1 was repealed in 1997, Holum is still illustrative of the position of the North
Dakota Supreme Court with regard to statutory privileges.
64. Holum v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 544 N.W.2d 148, 152 (N.D. 1996). Section 23-01-02.1 made
medical peer review proceedings, which follow complaints about the service provided by physicians,
privileged. Section 23-01-02.1 stated in part:
The proceedings and records of such a committee are not subject to subpoena or
discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action arising out of any matter which
is the subject of consideration by the committee. Information, documents, or records
........ " iSaC k fIrVia Utiginai sources are not immune trom discovery or use in any
civil action merely because they were presented during the proceedings of such a
committee, nor may any person who testified before such a committee or who is a
member of it be prevented from testifying as to matters within that person's knowledge,
but a witness cannot be asked about that witness' testimony before the committee.
Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.; N.D. R. EvID. 501; see also State v. Red Paint, 311 N.W.2d 182, 185 (N.D. 1991).
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derogation of the search for truth." 67 However, according to the court,
the rule of narrow construction is to be balanced against the "cardinal
rule of statutory construction, which requires that the interpretation must
be consistent with the legislative intent and done in a manner which will
accomplish the policy goals and objectives of the statute." 68 The court
found that policy arguments in favor of a broad privilege were unper-
suasive and noted that policy arguments are for the legislature. 69 In-
stead, the court held that the intent of the legislature must be determined
from a strict reading of the statutory language and a court should not
"disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit." 70 The court further noted that even though most states had
enacted similar peer review statutes and had case law broadly interpreting
the privilege, those decisions were of little persuasive authority because
of the lack of uniformity in the wording of the different state
provisions.71
The court's analysis in Holum provides a good example of how a
North Dakota court would likely interpret section 31-04-11.72 Like peer
review privilege statutes, mediation privilege and confidentiality statutes
lack uniformity among the states. 73 Because of the lack of uniformity,
court decisions interpreting these types of statutes in other states provide
little guidance. 74 Therefore, a strict reading of the language of section
31-04-11 is the key to determining the scope of its protection.
67. Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 152 (citing State v. Schroeder, 524 N.W.2d 837, 840 (N.D. 1994)).
The court went on to note that statutory privileges "will be strictly construed to protect only those
relationships which have been deemed to engender a public good which outweighs the principle that
all rational means should be employed to ascertain the truth." Id. (citing Red Paint, 311 N.W.2d at
185).
68. Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 152 (citing Olson v. University of North Dakota, 488 N.W.2d 386, 390
(N.D. 1992)).
69. Id. at 154. The court noted that "It]he legislature has sifted through the competing policy
concerns and adopted a statutory privilege. Our function is not to reevaluate those policy arguments,
but to ascertain the legislature's intent from the language of the statute." Id. (citing State v. Pippin, 496
N.W.2d 50, 52 (N.D. 1993)).
70. Id. The court noted that it "must be particularly vigilant against extending the scope of the
privilege beyond that warranted by the purpose expressed in the language of the statute." Id.
71. Id. at 153. In 1997, the legislature enacted a new medical peer review privilege. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-34-01 to 06 (Supp. 1997). The new statutes more clearly define the scope of the
privilege and provide separate confidentiality and evidentiary privilege provisions. See id.
72. See Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 152-57.
73. See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 179 (calling for uniformity in state confidentiality statutes to
avoid problems in multi-state litigation).
74. Although the mediation confidentiality statutes in North Dakota and California are similar,
there appears to be very little helpful case law in California defining the scope of the California
statute. But see Regents of the University of California v. Sumner, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 203 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (certified for partial publication) (noting that the California statute does not make
privileged a dictated oral transcript of a settlement made after the mediation discussions were over);
Garstang v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the mediation
privilege does not attach to mediation discussions if the statutory requirements are not strictly
followed).
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The language of section 31-04-11 reveals a lot about its scope and
the potential problems which could arise with its application. The first
potential problem is defining what type of statute was intended when the
legislature passed section 31-04-11. Specifically, it is not clear from the
language, or the legislative history, whether section 31-04-11 creates a
rule of privilege or merely a statutory rule of inadmissibility. 75 The
difference is significant. If a privilege was intended, then presumably,
statements falling within the scope of the statute's protection are not
discoverable. 76 Conversely, if section 31-04-11 is merely an evidentiary
rule, then information within the scope of section 31-04-11 may be
discoverable.
The placement of section 31-04-11 in chapter 31-04 outlining the
general rules on judicial proof, rather than in chapter 31-01, pertaining
to witness rights and privileges, supports the proposition that section 31-
04-11 was not intended to create a privilege. On the other hand, an argu-
ment could be made that the language of section 31-04-11 preventing
compelled disclosure of anything said in a mediation session in subse-
quent civil proceedings prevents discovery, thus creating a privilege.
However, given the approach of the court in Holum, it is quite possible
that a court would narrowly construe that language to restrict subpoena
power only, and not find a privilege. 77 This potential problem would be
best dealt with by specifically stating in the statute that information
which is not admissible is likewise not discoverable. 78 Clarification of
this potential problem in section 31-04-11 would no doubt add more
certainty to the question of confidentiality in mediation sessions in North
Dakota.79
75. See Minutes of Committee hearings for S.B. 2308, 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 408, § 1.
76. Rule 26(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: "Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." N.D. R. CiV. PRO. 26(b); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 340-41 (discussing the
effect of information being privileged).
77. Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 152-57.
78. Section 1119 of the California Evidence Code, after which section 31-04-11 of the North
Dakota Century Code was patterned, was amended in 1993 to include a prohibitin Aginct d;-,%,
of the mediation information. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (West Supp. 1998). The current version of
Section 1119 reads in part: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, evidence of anything said or
of any admission made in the course of the mediation is not admissible in evidence or subject to
discovery." See id.
Furthermore, North Dakota's current medical peer review privilege specifically provides for
protection from discovery. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-03 (Supp. 1997). Section 23-34-03 provides:
"Peer review records are privileged and are not subject to subpoena or discovery or introduction into
evidence in any civil or administrative action." N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-03; see also N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09.1-06 (1997) (pertaining to mediation in contested child custody proceedings).
79. It is interesting to note that the appeal in Holum resulted from a conflict over this issue.
Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 151-52. Specifically, the parties disagreed over whether section 23-02.1-08
made certain items privileged, thereby protecting those items from discovery requests. Id.
[VOL. 74:45
CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION IN MEDIATION
A second potential problem with the application of section 31-04-
11 pertains to the definitions of key terms. For instance, it is unclear
whether the term "mediation" includes all formal and informal methods
of dispute resolution, or merely includes formal mediation sessions with
certified mediators or judges.SO Another definition problem arises from
the phrase "evidence of anything said or of any admission made in the
course of the mediation." 8 I First, it is unclear whether statements made
leading up to the actual mediation session are covered. In light of the
court's analysis in Holum, it is likely that such statements are not pro-
tected.8 2 Second, the statute does not have an exception for otherwise
admissible items of evidence which are discussed during the mediation
session.8 3 Yet another potential definition problem arises from the
phrase "subsequent civil proceeding."8 4 It is not clear from this lan-
guage whether administrative proceedings are covered. 85 Although a stat-
ute can never be free from ambiguity, no matter how thorough, clear
definitions of these key concepts would be beneficial in promoting the
use of mediation in North Dakota.
A third potential problem with the application of section 31-04-11
is that it does not provide a rule of confidentiality. 8 6 Although the
legislative history seems to indicate that confidentiality was on the minds
of the legislators during committee hearings, nowhere in the statute is
confidentiality mentioned.8 7 Based on the court's analysis in Holum, a
duty on the part of the mediation participants and the mediator to refrain
from disclosing information obtained during the mediation session to
80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11. See Hearings on S. 2308 Before the North Dakota Senate
Judiciary Comm., Mar. 15, 1989 (noting concern over the definition of "mediation"). See also CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1115 (1997) (defining mediation and mediator).
81. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11.
82. See Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 152-57. This potential problem has been cured in California by
legislative amendment. Section 1119 of the California Evidence Code amended section 1152 in 1997
to provide that "evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of or, in the course
of, or pursuant to, a mediation or mediation consultation is [not] admissible." See Law Revision
Commission Comments, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (1997).
83. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11. This potential problem has also been remedied in Cali-
fornia by legislative amendment. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1120 (West Supp. 1998). Section 1120 of the
California Evidence Code specifically addresses the problem of otherwise admissible evidence. Id.
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11.
85. North Dakota's medical peer review privilege statute specifically provides for protection in
administrative proceedings. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-03. California has also remedied this potential
problem through legislative amendment. Section 1119 of the California Evidence Code provides that
information obtained during a mediation session shall not be admissible or subject to discovery "in any
arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which,
pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119.
86. See N.D. CENT CODE § 31-04-11.
87. See Minutes of Committee hearings for S.B. 2308, 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 408, § 1.
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third parties would be difficult to find in section 31-04-11.88 If the
legislature intended that information disclosed during mediation be
confidential as well as inadmissible, then a separate provision regarding
confidentiality should be added.8 9
A fourth potential problem with the application of section 31-04-11
is the lack of a rule prohibiting the mediator from giving testimony.
Rule 605 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides that a judge is
not competent to testify in cases over which he or she is presiding.90
Such a rule with regard to mediators would promote the mediator's
neutrality and give a greater sense of security to the mediating parties. 9 i
A final potential problem, which was raised in the committee
hearings prior to the passage of section 31-04-11, is that no matter what
type of protection the State of North Dakota erects over mediation
proceedings, the federal government is not prevented from administra-
tively subpoenaing mediation records or transcripts. 92 Because that is
the case, disputants who enter mediation may have a false sense of
security concerning the confidentiality of the proceedings if the Internal
Revenue Service or another federal agency comes knocking. 93
IV. CONCLUSION
Alternative dispute resolution, and especially mediation, has become
one of the fastest growing areas of the law. Mediation has been uni-
formly recognized as a litigation alternative that not only saves dispu-
tants time and money, but also permits them to work together to settle
88. See Holum v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 544 N.W.2d 148, 152-57 (N.D. 1996). In Holum, the court
took time to define the difference between information that is privileged versus information which is
confidential. Id. at 156-57. The court noted that the two are not synonymous, even though they are
compatible. Id. at 156. The court went on to note that privilege "addresses a person's right not to
have another testify as to certain matters as part of a judicial process while confidentiality addresses
the obligation to refrain from disclosing information to third parties other than as part of legal
process." Id.
89. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-02 (Supp. 1997) (providing a rule of confidentiality over medi-
cal peer review records separately from the rule of privilege); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-06 (Supp.
1997) (specifically providing that information derived from mediation session in contested ch!d c
'S cc cotial); S uiso C.AL EVD. CODE § 1119(c) (providing that "[a]ll communications, negotia-
tions, or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation or mediation
consultation shall remain confidential").
90. N.D. R. EVID. 605.
91. See CAL. EVID. CODE. § 703.5 (1995) (providing that "[n]o arbitrator or mediator, shall be
competent to testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or
ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding"). The California witness rule is
subject to exception much like the rule of inadmissibility in section 1119. See id.; N.L.R.B. v. Joseph
Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9th Cir. 1980).
92. Hearing on S. 2308 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 51st Legis. Sess. (N.D. 1985)
(letter to Janet Wentz, Chair of House Judiciary Committee, from Michael J. Ahlen, Professor of Law
at the University of North Dakota, Mar. 14, 1989).
93. Id.
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disputes and remain amicable afterward. North Dakota, like many other
states, has taken affirmative steps to promote the use of mediation. Over-
all, section 31-04-11 of the North Dakota Century Code is an example
of a decent mediation confidentiality statute which provides some protec-
tion to mediation participants. However, as section 31-04-11 approaches
its tenth year in existence, its flaws have yet to be fleshed out by the
courts. Based upon case law and legislative actions in other states, such
as California, and the actions of our own legislation with regard to other
statutory privileges, it would appear that section 31-04-11 is not flawless.
Therefore, if motivating disputants to utilize mediation is the policy
objective of section 31-04-11, then the legislature should address its
potential problems before the courts get a hold of it.

